Heap-based buffer overread while parsing mDNS RR section (off-by-one) #12
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CVE Reporting (2018-12-27) reporter
Function mdns_parse_rr that parses mDNS RR (resource records) section goes outside data buffer - offset variables (off and p) go outside size of input buffer (pkt_len). Vulnerable lines: mdns.c:665 mdns.c:668
Proposed CVSS 3.0 score: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L (3.7 Low)
Mitigation : While parsing the input buffer current offset should be checked and return with error when pkt_len is reached. Please take a look at patch that was produced to fix this issues in TizenRT (that uses tinysvcmdns):
2d9a3f156f
Packets that trigger this issue: crash_005_parse_rr.raw crash_007_parse_rr.raw
Crash details using Address Sanitizer:
crash_007_mdns_parse_rr.raw
crash_005_mdns_parse_rr.raw